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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 
78-2-2(3) of Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
A. Whether the trial court erred in granting Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in deciding as a matter of law that the Labor Contract 
allows an arbitration on the question of whether Plaintiff Jolley was terminated 
"based on [her] abilities, competency, fitness, and qualifications to perform work", 
when the Plaintiffs did not comply with the Labor Contract by filing an Article 13 
grievance to arbitrate that question. (Tr. at 16-17.) 
B. Whether the trial court's decision to allow an arbitrator to determine 
whether Jolley was terminated "based on [her] abilities, competency, fitness, and 
qualifications to perform work", is inconsistent with Section 78-3 la-4 of the Utah 
Arbitration Act. (Tr. at 18.) 
C. Whether the trial court erred by granting Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment in the face of genuine issues of material fact on the only 
arbitrability question properly presented to that court. (Utah Transit Authority's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 5-6, 
8-13.) 
D. Whether the trial court erred by failing to rule that Article 7 of the 
Labor Contract unambiguously precludes arbitration of any termination of a 
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probationary employee. (Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 3-8.) 
Alternatively, whether the trial court erred by granting the Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment when UTA offered, at a minimum, another 
reasonable interpretation of Article 7. (E.g., Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 3-8; Reply Memorandum in Support 
of Utah Transit Authority's Motion for Summary Judgment at 2-4 (UTA arguing 
that its interpretation of Article 7 is clear and unambiguous.) UTA preserved this 
alternate issue by arguing on brief and at hearing, that Article 7 unambiguously 
excluded terminations of probationary employees from the arbitration process. In 
doing so, UTA in effect argued that its interpretation is more than reasonable and 
prevents summary judgment for the Plaintiffs. Appellate courts recognize that 
parties cross-moving for summary judgment on a contract interpretation matter 
implicitly contend that they are "entitled to judgment as a matter of law, but that if 
the court determines otherwise, factual disputes exist which preclude judgment as 
a matter of law in favor of the other side". E.g., Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 
P.2d 821, 824-25 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Naturally then, cross-movants for 
summary judgment arguing that a contract is unambiguous under their respective 
interpretations implicitly argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law, but if the court denies one of those motions, the denied movant presented a 
interpretation that creates an ambiguity, precluding judgment as a matter of law in 
favor of the opposing movant. 
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Standard of Review: Because those issues flow from the trial court's granting or 
denial of summary judgment, this Court should review each issue "for correctness, 
according no deference to its legal conclusions". Ralph L. Wads worth Constr., Inc. v. 
West Jordan City, 999 P.2d 1240, 1242 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). "Summary judgment is 
appropriate only where no genuine issues of material fact exist and where the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law". Id. Therefore, in reviewing issue (C), 
the Court "view[s] the facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the losing party". 
Fashion Place Inv., Ltd. v. Salt Lake County, 776 P.2d 941, 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); 
see also Frisbee v. K & K Constr. Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984) (summary 
judgment is proper when "there is no reasonable probability that the party moved against 
could prevail"). 
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31 a-4: 
Court order to arbitrate. 
(1) The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an arbitration 
agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is raised concerning the 
existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of the matters covered by the 
agreement, the court shall determine those issues and order or deny arbitration 
accordingly. 
(2) If an issue subject to arbitration under the alleged arbitration agreement is 
involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court having jurisdiction to hear 
motions to compel arbitration, the motion shall be made to that court. Otherwise, the 
motion shall be made to a court with proper venue. 
(3) An order to submit an agreement to arbitration stays any action or proceeding 
involving an issue subject to arbitration under the agreement. However, if the issue is 
severable from the other issues in the action or proceeding, only the issue subject to 
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arbitration is stayed. If a motion is made in an action or proceeding, the order for 
arbitration shall include a stay of the action or proceeding. 
(4) Refusal to issue an order to arbitrate may not be grounded on a claim that an 
issue subject to arbitration lacks merit, or that fault or grounds for the claim have not 
been shown. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final judgment, titled Summary Judgment and Order to 
Arbitrate, entered in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
by the Honorable Judge Timothy R. Hanson, on September 5, 2002. (Addendum A.) 
B, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW 
On or about December 15, 2000, the Plaintiffs filed with the Third Judicial 
District a Complaint to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff Jolley's termination of 
employment with Defendant Utah Transit Authority ("UTA"). In the Complaint, 
the Plaintiffs requested that the Third Judicial District Court ("Trial Court") order 
arbitration of both Jolley's termination and the parties' disagreement regarding the 
interpretation of Article 7 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Utah 
Transit Authority and Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 382 ("Labor Contract"). 
(Complaint to Compel Arbitration ("Compl.") at U 16, B.) In May, 2002, the 
Plaintiffs and UTA filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On August 20, 
2002, the trial court heard argument on the Plaintiffs' and UTA's motions for 
summary judgment. On September 5, 2002, the Trial Court entered an order 
granting plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and requiring the parties to 
4 
arbitrate the question of "[w]hether or not the termination of employment of 
Caroline Jolley-Christensen by the Utah Transit Authority (UTA) was based on 
her abilities, competency, fitness, and qualifications to perform work". 
(September 5, 2002, Summary Judgment and Order to Arbitrate ("Order") at 2.) 
Further, the Trial Court ordered that, if the arbitrator found that Jolley "was 
terminated for reasons other than her ability, competency, fitness and 
qualifications to perform work", then an arbitration regarding the merits of the 
termination is further required. Id. On September 19, 2002, UTA appealed to the 
Utah Court of Appeals the Order in its entirety. On September 24, 2002, UTA 
filed an amended notice of appeal, to correctly appeal the Order to the Utah 
Supreme Court. On September 30, 2002, UTA also filed with the Third Judicial 
District Court a Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, which was granted in January, 
2003. 
On or about October 18, 2002, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Dismiss 
Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction. The Utah Court of Appeals denied the motion in 
an order dated March 14, 2003. On July 29, 2003, the Court of Appeals dismissed 
the appeal for failure of the Appellant to file a brief, but on August 1, 2003 voided 
that order of dismissal because the Court had not notified the parties of the 
briefing schedule. 
On September 9, 2003, the parties filed a Stipulation and Motion to 
Transfer Case to the Utah Supreme Court, and the case was subsequently 
transferred to the Supreme Court. The Plaintiffs have since requested that their 
earlier Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction be submitted for review by this 
Court. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about April 28, 1999, Plaintiff and Appellant Amalgamated Transit Union, 
Local 382 ("Union") entered into the Labor Contract, which was in effect at the time of 
Jolley's termination. The Labor Contract addresses when arbitration may be pursued, 
and how it will be conducted. With regard to probationary employees, paragraph A of 
Article 7 of the Labor Contract provides that: 
"All new employees shall be on probation until they have worked one 
hundred ten (110) days. During such period, the Authority is the sole judge 
of ability, competency, fitness and qualifications to perform work. This 
judgment shall not be subject to the grievance or arbitration procedure. 
Otherwise, the Union shall have the right to represent the employee." 
(Addendum B at 3.) 
Following Jolley's termination, the Union requested from UTA a review of 
Jolley's termination in letters dated August 24, 2000, and September 1, 2000. 
(Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment ("PI. Mem. in 
Support"), Exh. B; Compl., Exh. B.) The Union brought its request for a discipline 
review under Article 12 of the Labor Contract. (PI. Mem. in Support at f 8, Exh. F at ^ 
4.) UTA did not agree to the Union's request for a discipline review of Jolley's 
termination, and the Union later filed their Complaint to Compel Arbitration. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court's Order undercuts significant procedural requirements of the 
Labor Contract. The Trial Court in part ordered the parties to arbitrate whether Jolley 
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was terminated based on her "abilities, competency, fitness, and qualifications to perform 
work". (Order at 2.) However, that question is different from the question raised by the 
Union under Article 12 of the Labor Contract. Pursuant to Article 12, the Union sought a 
review of the merits of the Jolley termination. Accordingly, the Labor Contract limits the 
issue that may be arbitrated in this matter, if any, to the merits of the Jolley termination. 
At the same time, the Labor Contract prevents the Plaintiffs from now pursuing, and an 
arbitrator from now deciding, a contract interpretation or application dispute not 
preserved for arbitration under Article 13 of the Labor Contract. Because the Plaintiffs 
never filed a grievance relating to the Jolley matter under Article 13 of the Contract, the 
Plaintiffs lost any opportunity to take to an arbitrator a contract interpretation or 
application question relating to the Jolley termination. 
The Trial Court's first question for an arbitrator amounts to an arbitrability 
question, and a question that involves applying the contract language to the facts of the 
Jolley termination. Both such questions cannot be raised through the procedures of 
Article 12, but instead must be raised under the procedures of Article 13. Because the 
Plaintiffs passed on an Article 13 grievance, an arbitrator lacks jurisdiction under the 
Labor Contract to hear the Trial Court's first ordered arbitration question. Consequently, 
the Trial Court's Order is clearly at odds with the Labor Contract. 
While the Trial Court erroneously shifted to an arbitrator a question disallowed 
under the Labor Contract, it contemporaneously failed to fully answer the only 
arbitrability question pursued by the Plaintiffs under the Contract — whether the Jolley 
termination itself is arbitrable. The Trial Court's failure to decide that question also 
contradicts the Utah Arbitration Act. Under the plain language of that Act, the Trial 
Court should have "determined [the] issues" of arbitrability. By delegating to an 
arbitrator the ultimate determination of whether the Jolley termination is arbitrable, the 
Trial Court did not completely determine the arbitrability issues in accordance with the 
Act. 
If the Trial Court had properly reached the ultimate arbitrability question in this 
case, summary judgment for the Plaintiffs would have been prevented by genuine issues 
of material fact. Here, the Trial Court was required to decide whether the Jolley 
termination is arbitrable. Thus, to grant summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs, the 
Trial Court had to first decide that, in accordance with the Plaintiffs' interpretation of 
Article 7, Jolley was terminated for reasons unrelated to work performance. Otherwise, 
Jolley's termination would not be arbitrable under the Plaintiffs reading of Article 7. 
However, UTA raised genuine issues of material fact as to each of the factual allegations 
asserted by the Plaintiffs in support of their theory that Jolley was terminated for reasons 
unrelated to work performance. Summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs' 
interpretation of Article 7 was improper in view of those disputed factual allegations. 
Lastly, the Trial Court should have granted UTA's Motion for Summary Judgment 
because the second and third sentences of paragraph A of Article 7 unambiguously 
exclude any termination of a probationary employee from the arbitration process. In 
those sentences, the contracting parties meticulously reserved to UTA wide discretion 
regarding a probationary employee's work performance. Yet, that clear reservation of 
discretion will be wholly abrogated under the Plaintiffs' interpretation of Article 7 
8 
because UTA's discretion under those sentences will be scrutinized every time a decision 
is made on whether the probationary employee was terminated for reasons relating to 
work performance. That result compels the conclusion that Article 7 prohibits 
arbitrations of probationary employee terminations as a matter of law. 
When the Trial Court found that Article 7 does not unambiguously exclude 
probationary employee terminations from the arbitration process by denying UTA's 
Motion, it should have alternatively found that Article 7 is ambiguous because UTA 
raised a reasonable, alternate interpretation of that Article. Based on such an ambiguity, 
summary judgment for the Plaintiffs was improper. Correspondingly, absent a decision 
that Article 7 was unambiguous in UTA's favor, the Trial Court should have denied both 
summary judgment motions and allowed the parties to present to the Court extrinsic 
evidence to explain the parties intent under that Article. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DELEGATION OF AN ARBITRABILITY 
QUESTION TO THE ARBITRATOR VIOLATES THE LABOR 
CONTRACT. 
The Trial Court overlooked the Labor Contracts clear arbitration requirements 
when it ordered an arbitrator to decide whether Jolly was terminated based on work 
performance. (Order at 2.) The Trial Court committed reversible error by sending that 
question to an arbitrator for two principal reasons. First, the Trial Court failed to fully 
decide the only arbitrability question raised by the Union under the Labor Contract — 
whether the Jolly termination is arbitrable. Second, an arbitrator lacks jurisdiction under 
the Labor Contract to decide that question because the question was not grieved by the 
Plaintiffs as required under the Contract. Since an arbitrator is barred by the Labor 
Contract from reviewing first arbitration question ordered by the Trial Court, the Order 
should be vacated. 
A. The Labor Contract Requires the Union to Challenge UTA's 
Interpretation of the Contract, or Application of the Contract to Facts, 
under Article 13 of the Contract. 
The Union and UTA expressly agreed to two distinct processes for bringing 
a dispute to arbitration. Under the Labor Contract, a "suspension or discharge" is 
challenged under Article 12. (See Addendum B at 7-8.) If the Union elects to challenge 
a contemplated or administered discipline, it may only do so by requesting a discipline 
review in writing within the prescribed time. Id. Article 12 also details the subsequent 
review steps that the Union may invoke to challenge a discipline matter, including a 
preliminary hearing, a Grievance Review Committee, and an Article 14 arbitration. 
(Addendum B at 8-9.) 
By comparison, if the Union elects to challenge UTA's interpretation or 
application of the Labor Contract, it may only do so by filing a written grievance under 
Article 13. (Addendum B at 9 ("FIRST STEP . . . [t]he grievance form must be 
submitted in writing").) Article 13 enumerates the procedures that the Union must follow 
to pursue further review of the grieved issue, including an investigation and answer by 
the Human Resources Department, a Grievance Review Committee, and an Article 14 
arbitration. (Addendum B at 9-10.) 
UTA and the Union agreed that the Union must follow the procedures in Article 
12 to move a discipline to arbitration, and that the Union must follow the procedures in 
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Article 13 to move a contract interpretation or application dispute to arbitration. That 
agreement is cemented in the plain language of the Labor Contract. For instance, Article 
14 provides that "[ojnly grievances which have been timely processed by the Union 
through the grievance steps in Article 12 or 13 and which allege a violation of this 
Agreement including a claim alleging unjust suspension or termination) may be carried to 
arbitration". (Addendum B at 11.) In addition, under both Articles, the Union's request 
for arbitration is plainly contingent on the Union following the previously stated steps in 
the respective Articles. For example, under Article 12 the Union may only request 
arbitration "within twenty-eight (28) days after receipt of the decision of the hearing 
officer". (Addendum B at 8.) Similarly, under Article 13, the Union may only request 
arbitration "within twenty-eight (28) calendar days after the Step Two answer". 
(Addendum Bat 10.) 
In short, the parties to the Labor Contract established two independent processes 
for taking discipline disputes and contract language disputes to arbitration. The Labor 
Contract requires the Union to follow the Article 13 procedures to move a contract 
interpretation or application issue to arbitration. 
B. The Plaintiffs Never Filed a Grievance Under Article 13 of the 
Labor Contract. 
1. The Plaintiffs Only Sought a Discipline Review Under Article 12 
of the Labor Contract 
The Union elected to challenge Jolley's termination under Article 12 of the Labor 
Contract. For example, in an August 24, 2000, letter from the Union President, Steve 
Booth, to UTA, the Union President requested a "review of discipline". (PI. Mem. in 
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Support, Exh. B.) Again, in a September 1, 2000, letter from the Union President to 
UTA, the Union requested a "review of the discipline issued to Operator Caroline Jolley-
Christensen on or about July 18, 2000". (Compl., Exh. B.) Finally, the Plaintiffs 
admitted in their Points of Fact in the Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support, and in the 
Union President's attached sworn affidavit, that "pursuant to Article 12 of the CBA, 
Local 382 on behalf of Plaintiff Caroline Jolley filed a Request for Review of the 
disputed termination issued by UTA to Caroline". (PI. Mem. in Support at f^ 8, Exh. F at 
Tf 4.) Under the foregoing undisputed facts, there can be no doubt that the Union and 
Jolley elected to challenge the discharge, and pursued that challenge, under the discipline 
review procedures of Article 12 of the Labor Contract. 
2. The Record Lacks any Evidence that the Plaintiffs filed an 
Article 13 Grievance. 
There is no evidence in the record that the Plaintiffs at any time filed a grievance 
under Article 13 in connection with Jolley or Article 7. While the Plaintiffs assert in the 
Complaint that Jolley filed a grievance under Article 13, the Plaintiffs at no time 
supported that assertion with any competent evidence. On the contrary, the Plaintiffs 
subsequently conceded through the sworn statement of the Union President that they 
challenged Jolley's discharge under Article 12. Moreover, the Union can no longer 
timely file an Article 13 grievance in connection with this matter because the deadline for 
filing an Article 13 grievance has long since expired. {See, e.g., Addendum B (allowing 
the Union eleven days "after the incident giving rise to the incident is known to exist").) 
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C The Trial Court's First Question for the Arbitrator is Erroneous as a 
Matter of Law Because An Arbitrator is Contractually Limited to 
Reviewing the Merits of the Jolley Termination. 
1. The Trial Court Was Asked to Determine the Arbitrability of a 
Termination Challenged under Article 12 of the Labor Contract. 
Because the Plaintiffs requested a discipline review under Article 12 of the Labor 
Contract, and never filed a grievance under Article 13, the only permissible pathway to 
arbitration in connection with the Jolley discharge is through Article 12. As explained 
more fully in Section LA of this Brief, the Labor Contract requires the Union to pursue an 
arbitration of a discipline in accordance with the Article 12 procedural pathway, and to 
pursue a contract interpretation or application dispute under the Article 13 procedural 
pathway. Here, the Plaintiffs only challenged UTA's decisions concerning Jolley under 
Article 12 of the Labor Contract. Accordingly, when the Plaintiffs filed their Complaint 
to Compel Arbitration, the only arbitration that they could seek to compel under the terms 
of the Labor Contract was an arbitration of Jolley's termination.1 Hence, the only 
question before the Trial Court was whether the merits of the Jolley termination were 
arbitrable. 
1
 While the Plaintiffs suggested to the Trial Court that Article 13 permits the arbitration 
of contract interpretation disputes, and that the dispute in this case concerning the 
meaning of Article 7 of the Labor Contract should be heard by an arbitrator, the Plaintiffs 
are precluded by contract from seeking an Article 13 arbitration on a contract 
interpretation or application issue because they failed to file an Article 13 grievance as 
required under the Labor Contract. (E.g., Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 4.) 
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2. The Trial Court Failed to Fully Decide the Article 12 
Arbitrability Question. 
The Trial Court failed to decide whether the Jolley termination is arbitrable. If the 
Trial Court had done so, the only question for arbitration in the Trial Court's Order would 
be whether UTA had just cause to terminate Jolley. Instead, the Trial Court ordered that 
an arbitrator to first decide: 
Whether or not the termination of employment of Caroline Jolley-Christensen by 
Utah Transit Authority (UTA) was based upon her abilities, competency, fitness, 
and qualifications to perform work. 
(hereinafter, the "First Question for Arbitration" or "First Question"). (Order at f^ 2.) 
The Trial Court further ordered that, if the answer to the First Question for Arbitration is 
in the affirmative, then the jurisdiction of the arbitrator ends. (Order at f^ 3.) However, if 
the answer to the First Question is in the negative, "the arbitrator shall further find the 
reasons Caroline Jolley-Christensen was terminated and what, if any, remedies for said 
termination are appropriated [sic] under the parties5 Collective Bargaining Agreement". 
Id. 
By creating a threshold jurisdictional question for the arbitrator, the Trial Court 
has shifted, at least in part, the arbitrability question to an arbitrator. Under the Trial 
Court's two-step arbitration, before the arbitrator reaches the merits of the termination, 
the arbitrator must first decide whether the arbitrator has jurisdiction to even reach the 
merits of the termination and, in effect, whether the Jolley termination is arbitrable. 
Therefore, although the Trial Court interpreted the language of the Labor Contract to the 
extent that it decided that the Jolley discharge might be arbitrable (depending on the 
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arbitrator's answer to the First Question), it did not decide the arbitrability question of 
whether the Jolley termination is arbitrable. Rather, the Trial Court ordered an arbitrator 
to complete the arbitrability analysis on the Jolley termination. In brief, the Trial Court 
failed to decide the only arbitrability question properly presented by the Plaintiffs under 
the Labor Contract. 
3. An Arbitrator May Only Review the Merits of the Discipline 
Challenged by the Plaintiffs under Article 12. 
The First Question for Arbitration exceeds the Article 12 arbitration issue allowed 
under the Labor Contract. As discussed for fully infra, the Plaintiffs decided their 
arbitration fate when they elected to challenge the Jolley matter solely under Article 12 of 
the Labor Contract. Because Article 12 sets out the procedures for taking only the review 
of disciplines to arbitration, the arbitrator is limited to reviewing the merits of the 
discipline when an Article 12 challenge advances to arbitration. Accordingly, because 
the Plaintiffs only proceeded under Article 12, an arbitrator is likewise limited to 
reviewing only the merits of the Jolley termination. Since the First Question probes more 
than the merits of the termination by probing the arbitrator's jurisdiction to hear the 
merits, that Question is incongruent with the procedural mandate of the Labor Contract. 
D. The Labor Contract Prohibits the Plaintiffs from Arbitrating an 
Article 13 Issue Relating to the Jolley Termination. 
Because the Plaintiffs never filed an Article 13 grievance, the First Question is 
prohibited under the Labor Contract. Under the Labor Contract, an arbitrator may only 
arbitrate questions of contract interpretation or application if those questions are raised 
through the grievance procedures set forth in Article 13. In the present case, the First 
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Question for Arbitration is in effect an arbitrability question. Arbitrability questions 
hinge on the interpretation of language in an agreement to arbitrate, or to exclude 
arbitration, or the application of that language to a set of facts. For instance, under the 
First Question for Arbitration, the Trial Court ordered an arbitrator to decide whether 
Jolley was terminated based on her "abilities, competency, fitness, and qualifications to 
perform work", which in essence requires the arbitrator to apply Article 7 of the Labor 
Contract to the facts of the Jolley termination to determine whether the Jolley termination 
may be arbitrated. Therefore, the First Question is an arbitrability question. 
However, the Union did not grieve an arbitrability question in the present case. 
Under the Labor Contract, disputes concerning contract interpretation or application must 
be raised by the Union under Article 13 of the Labor Contract. Therefore, an arbitrator 
may only decide arbitrability, or apply the Contract to the Jolley facts, if the arbitrability 
question or contract application question is properly challenged via the Article 13 
pathway. The Plaintiffs could have filed a grievance under Article 13 when UTA did not 
agree to Plaintiffs' request for a discipline review of Jolley's termination based on its 
interpretation of Article 7. At that point, they could have claimed that UTA 
misinterpreted Article 7, or misapplied Article 7 to the Jolley facts. However, the 
Plaintiffs never filed such a grievance. 
Because the Plaintiffs did not pursue an Article 13 challenge of UTA's 
interpretation or application of Article 7, they cannot now seek to have that question 
heard by an arbitrator. Simply put, an arbitrator lacks jurisdiction under the Labor 
Contract to review an Article 13 question not properly grieved by the Plaintiffs in 
accordance with the Article 13 procedures. 
The Trial Court committed reversible error by sending to an arbitrator a question 
that is jurisdictionally barred under the Labor Contract. In reviewing a trial court's 
granting or denial of summary judgment, the appellate court reviews each issue under 
that judgment "for correctness, according no deference to its legal conclusions". West 
Jordan City, 999 P.2d at 1242. Here, the Plaintiffs are contractually barred from seeking 
a review of an arbitrability question from an arbitrator because they did not pursue a 
grievance under Article 13. By shifting an arbitrability question, and an Article 13 
question at that, to an arbitrator, the Trial Court interpreted or applied the Labor Contract 
in a manner that runs afoul of the Contract. Consequently, the summary judgment in 
favor of the Plaintiffs should be reversed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT FELL SHORT OF ITS OBLIGATION UNDER THE 
UTAH ARBITRATION ACT TO DECIDE THE ENTIRE 
ARBITRABILITY QUESTION. 
The Utah Arbitration Act ("Act") prohibits the Trial Court from deferring to an 
arbitrator the arbitrability question presented to that Court. The Act provides, in pertinent 
part, that: 
If an issue is raised concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the 
scope of the matters covered by the agreement, the court shall determine those 
issues and order or deny arbitration accordingly. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-31a-4(l) (Repealed effective May 15, 2003.) Under that Section 
78-31a-4(l), the Trial Court was obligated to determine the arbitrability question properly 
raised under the Labor Contract. Significantly, the Act did not provide that the Trial 
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Court could only decide a portion of that question. Instead, the Trial Court was expected 
to "determine those issues". 
The Trial Court failed to "determine those issues" relating to the arbitrability of 
the Jolley termination. As previously discussed in Section I.B.I of this Brief, because the 
Plaintiffs only sought review of the termination under Article 12 of the Labor Contract, 
the only issue that may conceivably have been arbitrated was whether the termination 
was proper. Therefore, when the Plaintiffs filed their Complaint to Compel Arbitration, 
the Trial Court was required under the Act to decide whether the Labor Contract required 
an arbitration of the termination. However, in effect, the Trial Court only decided that 
the termination may be arbitrable based on the Article 7 language, and left the completion 
of the arbitrability analysis to an arbitrator by way of the First Question. The Trial 
Court's divided approach to the arbitrability question is out of step with the Acts' plain 
intention under Section 78-31a-4(l) to reserve the entire determination of the arbitrability 
issues to the Court. 
III. A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDES SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS' INTERPRETATION OF 
ARTICLE 7. 
Based on both the Labor Contract and the Utah Arbitration Act, the Trial 
Court erred by failing to decide whether the Jolley termination is arbitrable. Had the 
Trial Court addressed that arbitrability question, it would have faced genuine issues of 
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material fact that bar summary judgment for the Plaintiffs on that question. 
Before entering summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs' interpretation of 
Article 7 of the Labor Contract, the Court was required to decide whether the Jolley 
termination was arbitrable as a matter of law and, therefore, whether the Plaintiffs had 
shown that Jolley was discharged for a reason unrelated to her work performance. In 
general, the Plaintiffs asserted that the second, third, and fourth sentences of paragraph A 
of Article 7 of the Labor Contract mean that, in the case of a probationary employee who 
is terminated for reasons other than ability, competency, fitness, or qualifications to 
perform work, the termination is arbitrable. (E.g., Transcript of Hearing Held August 20, 
2002 Before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson (hereinafter, "Tr. at ") at 5; Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition ("PI. Mem. in Opposition") at 3.) Thus, under the Plaintiffs' 
interpretation of paragraph A, arbitration of a probationary employee's termination is 
only appropriate if the termination is not based on the employee's ability, competency, 
fitness, or qualifications to perform work. Further, under that approach, arbitrability of 
the termination hinges on a threshold determination that the termination was not based on 
the employee's work performance. While the Trial Court interpreted paragraph A in 
favor of the Plaintiffs' contention that paragraph A allows for the arbitration of a 
termination of a probationary employee if the termination is not based on work 
The fact that UTA and the Plaintiffs filed cross-motions for summary judgment arguing 
that Article 7 of the Labor Contract is unambiguous did not prohibit UTA from asserting 
that there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment under 
Plaintiffs' interpretation of Article 7. See, e.g., Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 824-25. 
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performance, the Court did not decide whether Jolley's termination was based on work 
performance as a matter of law before summarily sending the termination to arbitration. 
Even if the Trial Court had reached the question of whether Jolley was terminated 
for reasons relating to work performance, genuine issues of material fact prevented a 
summary judgment on that question. "Summary judgment is appropriate only when there 
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law". Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). Here, 
summary judgment was wholly inappropriate because any facts regarding whether the 
Jolley termination was based on work performance were in dispute. Indeed, the Plaintiffs 
admitted that there is a factual dispute regarding the reason for Jolley's termination. (PL 
Mem. in Support at 4.) Moreover, at no time did the Plaintiffs offer a single sworn fact 
of a termination reason unrelated to Jolley's work performance. Therefore, a Trial Court 
could not possibly determine as a matter of law that Jolley's termination was unrelated to 
work performance.3 
Additionally, UTA demonstrated a genuine dispute regarding each of the three 
alleged facts which the Plaintiffs asserted to support their purported "good faith belief 
that Jolley was terminated for reasons other than work performance. (See PL Mem. in 
3
 Even the Trial Court appeared to recognize at hearing the lack of evidence in the record 
to support the Plaintiffs' pretext theory. (See, e.g., Tr. at 37,11. 16-19 (Judge Hanson 
asking Plaintiffs' counsel "What do you got to show this is not based upon the ability, the 
competency, the fitness, or qualifications to perform work. Am I just doing something 
for the sake of exercise?"), 38,11. 6-8 ("So if you choose not to present anything and you 
have not in your papers then I guess I'm going to have to take the position . . . you have 
nothing), 39,11. 7-8 ("But you're asking me to take on faith that there is something here 
that is not work related"). 
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Support at T| 12.) It is well settled that "[b]ecause disposition of a case on summary 
judgment denies the benefit of a trial on the merits, any doubt concerning questions of 
fact, including evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, should be 
resolved in favor of the opposing party". Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780 
P.2d 827, 831 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). UTA created doubt around, and defeated, each of 
the Plaintiffs' three alleged facts underlying their "good faith belief. First, UTA showed 
a genuine issue of material fact regarding the Plaintiffs' assertion that Jolley's 
"supervisor recommended that [Jolley] be granted permanent status" in a memorandum. 
(Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support at f^ 12(B).) In the proceedings below, UTA 
demonstrated through sworn affidavits that (i) the supervisor's memorandum was 
prepared before the end of Jolley's probationary period and before Jolley's subsequent 
performance deficiencies, (ii) the Manager of the operations division takes an organized 
approach to preparing for an operator's completion of probation, and asks supervisors to 
prepare such memoranda in advance of the end of probation to ensure that a bonus check 
is ready on the operator's completion of probation, (iii) the preparation of the 
memorandum did not alter Jolley's responsibility to continue to meet probationary 
employee performance expectations, (iv) Jolley incurred another missout and sick 
occurence, and a sick abuse policy violation, after the memorandum was written and 
before the end of her probationary period, and (v) the Manager, and not the supervisor 
who authored the memorandum, decides whether an employee passes probation. (UTA 
Mem. in Opposition at 9-10.) Based on those sworn facts, UTA raised doubt regarding 
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the Plaintiffs' "good faith belief to the extent such a belief was grounded in the 
supervisor's memorandum. 
Second, UTA raised a genuine issue of material fact concerning the Plaintiffs1 
allegation that "[u]nder UTA's own point system used to evaluate probationary 
employees, [Jolley] was within the standards for pertinent [sic] employment". (PL Mem. 
in Support at f 12(C), Exh. F at Tf 8(C).) In particular, UTA showed through supporting 
sworn statements that (i) the referenced point system is only one tool, and not the sole, 
determinative tool, for deciding whether a probationary employee passes probation, and 
(ii) Jolley's points under the referenced point system exceeded the 18-point guideline. 
Third, UTA created sufficient doubt concerning the Plaintiffs' claim that "[i]n the 
past, many probationary employees have been retained by UTA even though they had 
'attendance problems' more severe than [Jolley]". (Plaintiffs' Memorandum at Tf 12(A), 
Exh. F at If 8(A).) Based on uncontested affidavits, UTA convincingly showed that the 
Plaintiffs' claim was inaccurate. In fact, UTA's survey of other probationary employee 
records revealed that Jolley used more sick days than any other probationary operator in a 
near two-year period that included Jolley's period of employment. Also, UTA called into 
doubt each of the three Guidelines forms submitted by the Plaintiffs in support of their 
claim by showing that one of the forms did not relate to attendance, and the remaining 
forms did not reflect the number of work days missed to draw a meaningful comparison 
of attendance records. 
In brief, the Plaintiffs failed to offer any competent evidence of a reason for 
Jolley's termination that is not related to her work performance. Further, through sworn 
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statements UTA provided more than adequate competing facts to create a genuine issue 
of material fact regarding each of the three factual allegations that the Plaintiffs suggest 
support their "good faith basis" that Jolley was terminated for reasons other than work 
performance. As a result, the Trial Court could not determine as a matter of law that 
Jolley was terminated for reasons other than work performance. Because such a 
determination is integral to a summary judgment based on the Plaintiffs1 interpretation of 
the Labor Contract, summary judgment for the Plaintiffs was improper. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING UTA'S MOTION IN THE 
FACE OF UNAMBIGUOUS CONTRACT LANGUAGE THAT EXCLUDES 
THE ORDERED ARBITRATION. 
The Trial Court misapplied contract interpretation principles when it denied 
UTA's Motion for Summary Judgment. By ordering the First Question for Arbitration, 
the Court decided that the Labor Contract allows for the arbitration of a probationary 
employee's termination if the employee's termination is not related to work performance. 
(Order at 2.) To reach that decision, the Trial Court interpreted paragraph A of Article 7 
of the Labor Contract, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
All new employees shall be on probation until they have worked one hundred ten 
(110) days. During such period the Authority is the sole judge of ability, 
competency, fitness and qualifications to perform work. This judgment shall not 
be subject to the grievance or arbitration procedure. Otherwise, the Union shall 
have the right to represent the employee. 
(hereinafter, "paragraph A") (Addendum B at 3 (emphasis added).) Contrary to the Trial 
Court's holding, the second and third sentences of that language unambiguously bar 
arbitration of Jolley's termination as a matter of law. 
A. The Second and Third Sentences of Paragraph A of Article 7 Clearly 
Preclude Arbitration of a Probationary Employee's Termination. 
The parties to the Labor Contract plainly intended to forego arbitrations relating to 
a probationary employee's termination. "In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the 
parties are controlling". Central Florida Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Assoc's, 2002 UT 
3, U 12, 40 P.3d 599 (Utah 2002). Further, a court "'first look[s] to the four corners of the 
agreement to determine the intentions of the parties'". Id. quoting Ron Case Roofing & 
Asphalt v. Blomquist 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). Additionally, "[i]f the language 
within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties intentions are 
determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be 
inteipreted as a matter of law". Id. Contractual language is "ambiguous if it is capable of 
more than one reasonable interpretation because of 'uncertain meanings of terms, missing 
terms, or other facial deficiencies'". Winegar at 108 quoting Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 
P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983). In reviewing the Trial Court's interpretation of the Labor 
Contract at the summary judgment stage, this Court may review whether the Trial Court 
correctly decided whether paragraph A is ambiguous. See e.g., Interwest Construction v. 
Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1358-59 (Utah 1996). Here, the Trial Court erred as a matter of 
law when it failed to conclude that the second and third sentences of paragraph A can 
only be interpreted as UTA proposed to give any meaning to those sentences. 
The second sentence of paragraph A broadcasts in three key ways the contracting 
parties' intention to yield wide discretion to UTA on whether to retain a probationary 
employee. First, the parties went through great effort to explain the breadth of UTA's 
discretion regarding probationary employees when they stated that "the Authority is the 
sole judge of ability, competency, fitness and qualifications to perform work" during an 
employee's probationary period. (Addendum at 3 (emphasis added).) While the parties 
could have stopped at "ability" to perform work, or "qualifications to perform work", 
they decided not to do so. Instead, the contracting parties made an obvious effort to 
enumerate all scenarios relating to a probationary employee's work for UTA, and 
reserved judgment in all of those areas. Accordingly, the only reasonable interpretation 
of that phrase is that UTA has full discretion to judge all aspects of a probationary 
employee's performance. Second, the parties elected to designate UTA as the "judge" of 
a probationary employee's ability, competency, fitness, and qualifications. By using the 
term "judge", the parties plainly intended that UTA has the authority to make decisions 
regarding a probationary employee's performance based on the ordinary usage of that 
term. Third, by inserting the term "sole" before "judge", the parties elected to give added 
emphasis to the unobstructed decisions that UTA may make in connection with a 
probationary employee's performance. 
While the second sentence of paragraph A, in and of itself, delegates all 
decisionmaking on a probationary employee's performance to UTA, the third sentence 
leaves no room for misunderstanding of that delegation. In particular, the third sentence 
clearly provides that "[t]his judgment shall not be subject to the grievance or arbitration 
procedure". (Addendum B at 3.) By stating "[t]his judgment", the parties patently linked 
UTA's judgments on a probationary employee's performance to the judgments excluded 
from the arbitration procedure. Further, because "judgments" clearly include decisions, 
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and the "arbitration procedure" of Article 14 covers arbitrations of disciplines, the 
Contract when read as a whole unambiguously excludes from the Article 14 arbitration 
provisions UTA's decisions relating to a probationary employee's performance. 
B. The Second and Third Sentences Are Nullified Under the Trial Court's 
and Plaintiffs' Interpretation of those Sentences. 
The Labor Contract's clear exclusion of the Jolley termination from the Article 14 
arbitration process is grounded in the contract interpretation tenet that bars the 
"addition], ignoring], or discarding] of words" when interpreting contracts. Cornwall 
v. Willow Creek Country Club, 369 P.2d 928, 929 (Utah 1962). By denying UTA's 
motion for summary judgment, and granting the Plaintiffs' motion, the Trial Court 
effectively discarded the second and third sentences of paragraph A. 
The Plaintiffs and the Trial Court apparently agreed that the second and third 
sentences prohibit arbitration of UTA decision to terminate a probationary employee 
based on work performance. However, UTA has maintained that the second and third 
sentences musl also be interpreted to prohibit arbitrations of any UTA decision to 
terminate a probationary employee. To interpret those sentences in any other manner 
renders them meaningless. 
In particular, if the Union is allowed to file a discipline review under Article 12 
any time it has an alleged "good faith belief that a probationary employee was not 
terminated for a performance reason, UTA's sole judgment on the "ability competency, 
fitness and qualification [of a probationary employee] to perform work" will be 
scrutinized in an arbitral forum despite the clear intention of the parties to isolate those 
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judgments from that process. For example, as a practical matter an arbitrator cannot 
review whether the termination of a probationary employee was related to work 
performance without probing the reasons for the termination and, at the same time, 
UTA's "judgment" regarding the employee's work performance. Indeed, if the Trial 
Court's Order is affirmed, the arbitrator will hear testimony regarding, and dissect, 
UTA's thoughts and decisions on, Jolley's work performance to determine whether she 
was terminated for performance-related reasons. Moreover, the Labor Contract's 
reservation of sole discretion to UTA on decisions regarding a probationary employee's 
performance cannot reasonably be unraveled by a mere hunch or "good faith belief of 
the Union that the employee was not terminated for performance reasons. 
Because the second and third sentences are nullified if UTA's interpretation of 
those sentences is not granted, the Trial Court erred in finding any merit in the Plaintiffs' 
interpretation.4 At the end of the day, the Plaintiffs' and Trial Court's interpretation of 
paragraph A is wholly unreasonable because is depletes the second and third sentences of 
any meaning. Because there is no alternate reasonable interpretation to compete with 
UTA's reading of those sentences, those sentences unambiguously preclude arbitrations 
of probationary employee terminations as a matter of law. 
For the same reasons, the Trial Court's focus on the phrase "to perform work" in the 
second sentence is unreasonable. Surely, the contracting parties did not carefully script 
the second sentence to grant extensive discretion to UTA regarding probationary 
employees, only to see that discretion so easily quashed by conjecture that UTA's 
judgment was not based on work perfomiance. Instead, it is far more reasonable to 
conclude that the parties intended to exclude all probationary employee terminations 
from review, rather than carve out an exception that swallows the rule. 
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Similarly, the fourth sentence of paragraph A cannot be reasonably construed to 
allow arbitrations of probationary employee terminations that are not based on 
performance and thereby, undermine the second and third sentences of that paragraph. 
The Plaintiffs suggested that the fourth sentence means that the Union "shall have the 
right to represent the employee" in connection with a termination not based on a 
probationary employee's ability, competency, fitness, and qualifications to perform work. 
(PL Mem. in Opposition at 3.) However, like the Plaintiffs' interpretation of the second 
and third sentences, their interpretation of the fourth sentence would allow an arbitrator to 
question UTA's "sole judgment" of a probationary employee's ability, competency, 
fitness, and qualifications to perform work" by simply touting a "good faith belief that a 
termination of a probationary employee was not based on work performance. 
Additionally, the Plaintiffs' interpretation of the fourth sentence is unreasonable 
in the context of the entire Labor Contract. Under the Labor Contract, the Union 
represents probationary employees and regular employees alike on matters unrelated to 
terminations or other disciplines, including but not limited to transfers, seniority, wages, 
and working conditions. (E.g., UTA Mem. in Support, Exh. A at 3 (transfers), 4 
(seniority), 22 (wages), 39 (addressing some operator working conditions).) Thus, the 
fourth sentence simply clarifies the Union's option to continue to represent probationary 
employees on matters that affect all probationary employees. 
Because the Plaintiffs' interpretation of the fourth sentence unnaturally stretches 
that sentence beyond its plain meaning, and requires a discarding of the second and third 
sentences, that interpretation is unreasonable. Accordingly, the Trial Court erred to the 
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extent that it relied upon that interpretation of the fourth sentence in denying UTA's 
motion. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING THE PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION BECAUSE UTA'S INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 7 IS, AT A 
MINIMUM, A REASONABLE ALTERNATE INTERPRETATION THAT 
CREATES AN AMBIGUITY THAT BARS SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR 
THE PLAINTIFFS. 
Even if the Trial Court did not interpret the language of paragraph A of Article 7 
to unambiguously exclude an arbitration of any termination of a probationary employee, 
the Trial Court was compelled to rule that UTA presented a reasonable contract 
interpretation that such an exclusion exists, and that the relevant language was 
ambiguous. "[A] motion for summary judgment may not be granted if a legal conclusion 
is reached that an ambiguity exists in the contract and there is a factual issue as to what 
the parties intended". Faulkner, 665 P.2d at 1293. 
In the present case, even if the meaning of paragraph A is not unambiguous in 
favor of UTA's interpretation of that paragraph, then at the very least, an ambiguity 
exists in that language that renders erroneous the Trial Court's granting of summary 
judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs. UTA presented to the Trial Court, and now to this 
Court, an interpretation of paragraph A that is more than reasonable. For example, UTA 
has shown that the second, third, and fourth sentences of paragraph A may be reasonably 
construed to exclude all terminations of probationary employees from the arbitration 
process. The reasonability of that interpretation is anchored in the breadth of the 
discretion granted to UTA in the second sentence of paragraph A, and the wholly 
unintended outcome of any other interpretation. For instance, if those sentences do not 
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exclude arbitrations of all probationary employee terminations, the plain intent of second 
and third sentences of paragraph A to reserve judgments on probationary employees' 
work performance to UTA, will be lost.5 
In short, UTA presented to the Trial Court a compelling and reasonable 
interpretation of paragraph A as an alternative to the Plaintiffs' interpretation of that 
paragraph. As a result, the dispositive language on arbitrability is ambiguous if not 
unambiguous in UTA's favor. Based on such an ambiguity, the Trial Court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs' was reversible error. 
Furthermore, because paragraph A is, at a minimum, ambiguous, if not 
unambiguous in UTA's favor, the Trial Court erroneously deprived UTA of the 
opportunity to present extrinsic evidence to demonstrate the contracting parties' intent 
under paragraph A. If an ambiguity exists in the contract, the court interpreting the 
contract must examine extrinsic evidence "in order to determine the intentions of the 
parties". Central Florida at ^ 12. Here, UTA's reasonable interpretation of paragraph A 
prompts at least an ambiguity that compels an opportunity for the parties to present to the 
Trial Court parole evidence, practice evidence, or other extrinsic evidence to illuminate 
the parties' intent under paragraph A. See e.g., Colonial Leasing Co. of New England, 
The Trial Court appears to have already recognized that UTA presented a reasonable 
alternate interpretation to the Plaintiffs interpretation of paragraph A. The Court inferred 
that it viewed the contract as "pretty straightforward" in favor of UTA's interpretation at 
the start of the hearing, but stated at the end of the hearing that he was "not so sure now". 
(Tr. at 43,11. 24-25, 44,11. 1-3.) Presumably, the Trial Court found reasonability in 
UTA's interpretation if it was leaning toward ruling in favor of that interpretation at the 
start of the hearing. (Tr. at 5,11. 3-4 (Judge stating to Plaintiffs' counsel "Tell me why 
Article 7 doesn't mean what it appears to say"). 
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Inc. v. Larsen Bros. Construction Co., 731 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986) (parole evidence 
admissible to clarify parties intent under agreement); Zeese v. Estate of Seigel 534 P.2d 
85, 90 (Utah 1975) (doctrine of practical construction). The Trial Court erred by denying 
UTA that opportunity. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the Trial Court's First Question for Arbitration is contractually barred, 
UTA respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Trial Court's granting of summary 
judgment for the Plaintiffs and vacate the Order connected with that judgment. In 
addition, UTA requests that this Court reverse the granting of Plaintiffs' motion because 
the Trial Court did not decide the arbitrability question raised with that Court and, if it 
had, genuine issues of material fact existed to preclude summary judgment on that 
arbitrability question. 
Finally, UTA asks this Court to reverse the Trial Court's granting of Plaintiffs' 
motion for summary judgment, reverse that Court's denial of UTA's motion for summary 
judgment, and find that UTA's interpretation of the Labor Contract is unambiguous as a 
matter of law. However, even if this Court does not find that the Labor Contract 
language unambiguously supports UTA's position, UTA requests that this Court reverse 
the granting of Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion and remand this matter to the Trial 
Court to allow for the presentation of extrinsic evidence on the intent of the contracting 
parties. 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Summary Judgment and Order to Arbitrate of the Honorable Judge Timothy R. 
Hanson, dated September 5, 2002. 
B. Articles 7, 12, 13, and 14 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Utah 
Transit Authority and Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 382. 
Id 
Tab A 
JOSEPH E. HATCH (#1415) 
JOSEPH E. HATCH, P.C. 
341 South Main Street, Suite 303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 538-0400 
Facsimile (801) 538-0423 
Attorney ioi Plaintiffs 
IN I'Hh; THIKh II IDK'IAI, DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, 
LOCAL 382, an unincorporated labor 
organization, and CAROLINE 
JOLLEY-CHRISTENSEN, an 
individual, 
Plaintiffs, | 
vs. j 
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a Utah | 
incorporated special transit district, j 
Defendant. 
Plaintiffs' Moi KIII for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment both dated May 2, 2002, came regularly before the 
Honorable I'mioU'v R Uans< n one oi thr judges ol the above entitled court, for 
oral argument on August 20, 2002. The Plaintiffs were represented by Council, 
Joseph h Hatch, I'lu1 Detuidant was represented hy Couneil, DesireeD. Peri. 
F K r D d D ' S J ^ C T COURT 
Third Judicial District 
S f P - 5 2002 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
TO ARBITRATE 
Civil No. 000910111 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
The Court, having c- -...:< < • i leadings, papers a i id IT lemorandum on file 
herein and having heard the oral argument, entered the basis for its ruling on 
the record and is now prepared to enter the following: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion For Surr. «u:-,w < *.T jr.-
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
2. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated tj ^ u- • • , -o t a-.-
and pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the parties dated 
April 28, 1999, the parties shall submit to arbitration the following issue: 
Whether or not the termination of employment of Caroline 
Jolley-Christensen by the Utah Transit Authority (UTA) 
was based upon her abilities, competency, fitness, and 
qualifications to perform work. 
3. Should the arbitrator find that Caroline Jolley-Christensen's 
employment was terminated because of her ability, c on lpetei icy , fitness, a nd 
qualifications (or lack thereof) to perform work, the jurisdiction of the arbitrator 
shall end and Caroline Jolley-Christensen's termina tioi i sha 11 be decreed 
appropriate under the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement. However, 
should the arbitrator find that Caroline Jolley-Christensen s employment was 
terminated by the UTA for reasons other than her ability, 
competency, fitness and qualifications to perform work, then the arbitrator 
sha11 further find the reasons Caroline Jolley-Christensen was terminated and 
what, if any, remedies for said termination are appropriated under the parties' 
Collective Bargaining Agreement. 
4 Plaintiffs are awarded their costs. 
DATED this ^ day of Jb_fj~~ 2<2fb2. 
"he Honorable Timothy R^jhanson 
'Third Dis t r i^Cour t Judgg 
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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN 
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY AND 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, LOCAL 382 
ARIICLE 1: DURATION OF AGREEMENT 
The Agreement is effective December 11, 1998, and continues in full force and effect 
through December 10, 2003, and from year to year thereafter unless either party shall give notice 
of a desire to ter i n inate oi n lodi fy the Agreement not less tha n sixty (60) days prior to such 
expiration date or its anniversary. 
ARTICLE 2; UNION RECOGNITION 
The Authority recognizes the Union as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent 
f oi all i notoi coach and I ,R\ opei ators (except worker service operator s as defined in Article 
42), parts and maintenance employees of the Authority. 
Union representatives designated in writing shall be permitted to transact Union business. 
on the premises of the A i ithoi ity dui ing voi ki rig 1 ioi n s > ; ith i na nagemei it persom lei or with 
bargaining unit employees who can be and are relieved from duty. No representative shall 
interfere with or delay any employee at work. Union representatives shall not neglect any work 
for the Authority unless officially relieved of duty. Twenty-four (24) hours advance notice shall 
be given when possible, in any case at least one (1) hour notice shall be given or by 5:00 a.m if 
I he Hn}iIoyfT i' iPt'iimni In icpnil hefoie (» Oil a in. 
Concerning any committee created by the Authority dealing with the terms and conditions 
of employment and which is comprised in part of bargaining unit personnel, the I Jnion shall 
l 
engage in any lockouts during the term of this Agreement. 
ARTICLE 6: ADMINISTRATION OF THE AGREEMENT 
Any business necessary to administer this Agreement shall be between designated 
representatives of the Authority and of the Union or the International Union. 
Before either party makes public any matter relating to issues covered by this Agreement, 
the local Union President and the Director of Human Resources shall meet together in person to 
discuss such matter. If no mutual resolution is reached, the parues shall defer contact with the 
public for 24 hours. 
ARTICLE 7: PROBATIONARY PERIOD 
A. All new employees shall be on probation until they have worked one hundred ten 
(110) days. During such period the .Authority is the sole judge of ability, competency, fitness and 
qualifications to perform work. This judgment shall not be subject to the grievance or arbitration 
procedure. Otherwise the Union snail have the right to- represent the employee. Upon 
completion of the probationary period, the employee shall have seniority back to the date of 
employment, and if two or more employees begin work on the same day, their place on the 
seniority list shall be determined by lot. 
B. Employees who complete the 110 working shifts probation period in one 
department and later transfer to another department shall be considered to have completed the 
probationary period set forth in this Article for the purposes of termination of employment, but 
shall be considered probationary employees for the first 60 days worked in the new department 
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considered permanent and seniority in the former depa rtment shall be reta ined up to the date of 
transfer but shall nc: thereafter accumulate. Seniority in the new depanment shall commence as 
of the initial date cf transfer. 
Any employee accepting full time Union office or a permanent assignment outside the 
bargaining unit with the Authority, shall retain and accumulate seniority during the period of such 
ser vice I Ipoi i i et: :i n ing to the bargaining unit the employee shall return,, to his/her original 
classification and may exercise seniority to take the least senior available assignment or regular 
run but otherwise shall bid for assignment on the next regular change or bid day. 
Seniority " c ::: iti i mes to accumulate di iriiig any layoff or appi cved leave of abse: ice such 
as for sickness or injury. Time zr. ieave is not considered time worked for any purpose except 
accumulation of seniority. 
Seniority "- ?J\ be lost whenever i •< npnvcv . . ,; is discharged for just i.aust* it.1 tires; 
or fails to return to work within five ^5) work days alter the end of a leave of absence or the 
receipt of notice cf recall from a layoff. 
ARTICLE 9: LAYOFFS AND RECALLS 
>i nu* t \i uj\ auvanu' uniuc ui neeessai\ Myoiis snail be given Regular force 
reductions shall be in the reverse order of departmental seniority. As classifications are reduced, 
a senior employee facing lay-o££ may within five (5) days, displace a junior employee in a lower 
classification. Any displaced employee shall li.ivc the sanu pmilej'e unless (ncnentnl from doing 
so by sickness or leave of absence. 
When ifLMiMi luicei of motor coach operators, parts or maintenance employees are 
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is not discharged for other reasons, shall be granted a leave of absence. 
ARTICLE 11 NOTICE OF DISCIPLINE 
Employees shall be advised of any discipline or charges within eleven (11) calendar days 
after the General Manager of the Authority or its designees have knowledge of any alleged 
violation of Authority rules or other offenses. Oral warnings may be given, or the employee shall 
be furnished a written statement of the offense or discipline. The written statement shall include 
a description of the actions or behavior in which the employee is alleged to have engaged. Such 
statement shail be sufficiently precise and complete so that the employee may be able to identify 
the actions or behavior to which reference is made. For the purposes of this Article, persons who 
have been retained to monitor service and performance shall be deemed designees of the General 
Manager. Also, with respect to discipline for chargeable accidents, the time period under this 
Article shall commence to run when the Accident Review Committee's report is received and 
time-stamped in the Risk Management Department of the Authority. A copy of the time-stamped 
report shall be furnished to the Union. 
ARTICLE 12: SUSPENSION OR DISCHARGE 
A prompt review shall be made in any situation where discharge or other discipline is 
contemplated or has been administered, provided request for such review is made in writing to 
the Human Resources Department within eleven (11) calendar days following notice by the 
Authority to the Union that discharge or discipline may be involved. If no request is made to the 
Authority within that time, and the discharge or discipline is administered by the Authority, such 
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with i -I \y ifhuiii hack pay as deemed jusuiied b>' the" facts and evidence. 
If either parry fails to meet the above time limits, the other party may automatically move 
the matter to the next step in the procedure or arbitration. If a matter is not appealed by the 
Union to the next step in a timely manner, it shall be deemed i esolved 01 1 tl le basis of the last 
answer; provided, however, that if the Authority fails to meet any of the time deadlines and the 
Union carries the matter to the next step, the Authority shall pay to the Union a penalty of $400. 
ARTICLE 13: PROCEDURE FOR GRIEVANCES 
The term "grievance", shail mean a complaint and/or dispute by the Union and/or 
employee concerning the proper interpretation or application of any provision of this Agreement. 
FIRST STEP: All grievances should first be discussed with the immediate 
supei v isoi wl ic) si 101 ilci be adv ised oi the pai ticular sectioi I of the agreement that is involved [lie 
Union and the Authority agree that it is in the best interest of all parties to settle the dispute at 
this stage. If not resolved in that discussion, or if other circumstances warrant, the Union or the 
employee may fill out a grievance form pi o v ided b> t i: ic A,i ithority. I he grievance form must be 
submitted in writing to the Human Resources D.epanment within eleven (11) calendar days after 
the incident giving rise to the grievance is known to exist. Grievances in the Mount Ogden and 
Timpanogos Divisions may be filed with the Operations Division Manager 's office 
STEP TWO: Within seven (7) calendar days following the filing of a grievance, 
ihr Human Resources Deparlmein > ill investigate the tacts and evidence giving rise to the 
grievance and shall give to the Union a written answer to the grievance. 
STEP THREE: If the grievance is not satisfactorily resolved by the Step Two-
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.Ail reasonable efforts should be made to avoid the expense and trouble of arbitration. 
Within thirty-five (35) calendar days of request for arbitration, the parties shall either agree upon 
an arbitrator or shall give notice of selection to the arbitrator who is next in order on the 
expedited list of arbitrators existing as of the date of this Agreement. During the term of this 
Agreement, either party may exercise one peremptory challenge to any arbitrator on the expedited 
panel. If an arbitrator is removed by such challenge or by mutual agreement, a replacement shall 
be selected by requesting a panel of names from the Federal Mediation Service. Seven (7) 
calendar days after receipt of such panel the parties shall selea the replacement arbitrator by 
alternately striking names from the panel with the first strike determined by lot. Extensions of up 
to seven (7) calendar days may be granted for either party if written or verbal request is made 
within forty-eight (48) hours of the original deadline. If the Union fails timely to seiect an 
arbitrator, the grievance shall be deemed withdrawn. 
Both parties shall reduce to writing their agreed positions with respect to facts, evidence, 
and issues, and any disputed facts, evidence or issues. In discipline or discharge cases, no 
transcripts or post-hearing briefs shall be used unless requested by the Union, and the decision 
of the arbitrator shall be rendered within five (5) calendar days. In other cases, transcripts and 
post-hearing briefs may be omitted by mutual agreement, and a time limit for decision may be set 
by mutual agreement. 
The arbitrator shall have no power to change this Agreement nor to impose any terms or 
conditions the arbitrator might think the parties should have agreed upon. The arbitrator's power 
is limited to finding the facts and to applying the terms of this Agreement to those facts. The 
Union and the Authority shall equally share the expense and charges of the arbitrator. The 
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